The study of sexual selection has recently been enriched by an explicit life history focus. This lifetime perspective has much to offer the field; however, most existing interdisciplinary exchanges have restricted themselves to the context of mate choice and associated phenomena. The present study explores the consequences of an explicit life history view upon the evolution of male-male contest competition. Key to this view is the fact that fighting typically has lifetime consequences, and thus the costs involved with contests are best considered in lifetime currencies such as residual reproductive value. The rate of contemporary contest cost accrual may vary among contestants due to differences between them in what they 'stand to lose', in terms of future reproductive opportunities. It is also suggested that it may be fruitful to partition key life history parameters into components that are either dependent or independent of future choice of mating strategy. Using a simple simulation, it is demonstrated that the optimum pattern of lifetime contest participation may vary depending upon lifetime variation in 'strategy-independent' components of reproductive value (such as the rate of mortality experienced in contexts unrelated to mating behaviour). In line with previous models of age-specific sexual advertisement, increasing lifetime aggression appears as the most favoured strategy; however, young age aggression is predicted if resource holding potential is expected to decline with age irrespective of prior contest participation. The model is discussed, along with key concepts surrounding the life history viewpoint, in light of prior life history/sexual selection models and the existing empirical data regarding lifetime fighting strategies in the wild.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a concerted push toward viewing the processes and outcomes of sexual selection from a life history perspective (Kokko, 1997; Höglund & Sheldon, 1998; Kokko, 1998; Svensson & Sheldon, 1998; Candolin, 2000; Brooks & Kemp, 2001) . At the forefront of this conceptual thrust are the theoretical and empirical investigations of Kokko and colleagues (Kokko, 1997 (Kokko, , 1998 Kokko & Lindstrom, 1996; Kokko et al ., 1999 Kokko et al ., , 2002 ) that target agedependent male advertisement and female mating preferences. By virtue of an explicit life history viewpoint, these studies offer novel insights into the evolution of male and female reproductive behaviour that promise to steer the field in productive new directions.
As an example, Kokko et al . (2002) recently demonstrated that many of the hallmark differences between viability indicator and Fisherian models of mate choice evaporate if life history trade-offs between survival, advertisement, and attractiveness are considered. Ultimately, these two models are revealed as extreme endpoints of a unified process, thus effectively defusing an enduring conceptual debate (Eshel, Volovik & Sansone, 2000) . Other benefits have flowed from this life history-inspired view of female choice, including an improved understanding of the types of phenotypic traits that should evolve as indicators of male genetic quality (Kokko et al ., 1999) and a more precise statement regarding the action of phenomena such as ageing (Brooks & Kemp, 2001) .
In essence, the life history viewpoint recognizes that individuals live finite lifespans and possess finite expendable resources, and that investments channelled into various activities at various life stages cannot be considered strictly independent of one another (Williams, 1966; Stearns, 1992) . Allocation of resources to a particular cause, such as sexual advertisement, is therefore expected to detract from that individual's capacity for future investments, in that they are subject to trade-offs (Stearns, 1992; Reznick, Nunney & Tessier, 2000) . This general concept is not new: life historians have long held that trade-offs ultimately shape many important aspects of an organism's biology, such as the timing of reproduction and growth, temporal patterns of resource utilization, size at maturity, and the timing of senescence (Hamilton, 1966) . Similarly, behavioural ecologists have also known for some time that trade-offs occur and that they might be important in shaping the ways in which individuals interact with each other (Trivers, 1972; Partridge & Endler, 1987) . However, these views have rarely been made explicit. Only very recently has a push been mounted towards studying and representing these phenomena in a rigorous and quantitative manner.
Although behavioural ecologists are now embracing the principles of life history theory, most interdisciplinary exchanges focus on a single context of sexual selection: mate choice (Hansen & Price, 1995; Kokko & Lindstrom, 1996; Kokko, 1997 Kokko, , 1998 Price & Hansen, 1998; Kokko et al ., 1999 Kokko et al ., , 2002 Beck & Powell, 2000; Jones, Balmford & Quinnell, 2000; Proulx, Day & Rowe, 2002) . As mentioned above, this has resulted in some important conceptual advances (Brooks & Kemp, 2001; Kokko et al ., 2002) ; however, life history principles are ultimately relevant to all contexts of sexual selection (Partridge & Endler, 1987) . Any situation involving reproductive effort is by definition a life history issue. Hence, costly male (and sometimes female) investments into morphological traits, such as advertisement signals, status signals, armament and sensory structures, and behavioural traits, such as mate searching, sexual display, and fighting, are all expected to be subject to trade-offs and the laws of life history evolution. Life history theory therefore has the potential to exert a unifying conceptual influence over the study of sexual selection, just as it has over our understanding of 'conventional' aspects of reproductive effort (Stearns, 1992) . However, for this unification to occur, it is important that all evolutionary ecologists, and not just those interested in the evolution of mate choice, fully appreciate and embrace the life history viewpoint.
The present study explores the explicit life history view of sexual selection with respect to the evolution of male mating strategies. This conceptual exploration is relevant to any system in which males compete directly for access to mates or the resources required to gain matings, and in which a number of different tactics (e.g. territorial, sneaky, etc.) or a 'continuum' of mating tactics are available. However, the argument is developed with specific reference to male-male contests and the evolution of optimal contest behaviour. This is for three reasons. First, contests have been extensively studied, both empirically and theoretically, yet most treatments fail to adequately consider life history principles (although there are exceptions, Enquist & Leimar, 1990) . Contests are generally treated as static, isolated episodes but, in reality, they are seated within the broader context of each contestant's lifetime, which bears particular (but not exclusive) relevance to the economics of contest participation. Thus, an explicit life history viewpoint has much to offer the study of optimal contest behaviour. Second, contest competition lends itself to the mathematics of phenotypic modelling (Maynard Smith, 1982; Enquist & Leimar, 1983 Leimar & Enquist, 1984; Mesterton-Gibbons et al. , 1996; Payne & Pagel, 1997; Payne, 1998) , and there is an existing set of parameters (e.g. resource holding potential) to which life history principles can be readily applied. Third, this form of competition is extremely widespread and the principles of contest theory apply widely; hence, there is considerable heuristic value in using this context as a platform for presenting life history ideas.
The present study explores the theoretical implications of the life history viewpoint, presents a simple population model of lifetime fighting, and discusses the results of this model and the general concept in light of several real-world contest systems.
A NIMAL CONTESTS AS LIFE HISTORY EVENTS
Our present understanding of contest evolution has been moulded by the development and refinement of phenotypic models, particularly those based upon evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) . Contemporary evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) models represent the evolution of fighting behaviour as ultimately mediated by a balance between the value of a disputed resource and the cost of fighting for it. Asymmetries in cost accrual are perhaps more likely to underpin schedules of contest settlement than resource value asymmetries because the former can be radically affected by each contestant's state (although each can be important in particular systems). Temporally fluid determinants of state, such as energy reserves, strength, and body size, may directly affect an individual's ability to inflict contest costs and/or minimize the inclusive rate of cost accrual (Marden & Waage, 1990) . These attributes constitute the parameter known as resource holding potential (RHP; Parker, 1974) . On this basis, contest participants may be selected for their ability to assess pairwise RHP asymmetries as a surrogate for likely contest costs, and many recent elaborations of contest theory centre around how this assessment takes place (Enquist & Leimar, 1983 Payne & Pagel, 1997) .
Aside from intrapopulation differences in RHP, another fundamental and potentially large (yet essentially unexplored) determinant of contest costs is variation in what each individual 'stands to lose'. If all else is equal, then a young male, if seriously injured or killed in a contest, may pay a greater cost than an older male subject to an equivalent fate because the former individual has forgone his entire lifetime potential for reproduction (Parker, 1974) . Thus, whereas RHP refers to an individual's capacity to inflict and/or avoid costs in an absolute sense, the alternate 'relative' source of variation in contest costs is driven by differences in what these absolute levels of cost 'mean' to each individual with respect to lifetime fitness value. This view represents the very essence of the life history interpretation of risky reproductive behaviours: when measured in life history terms, the proportionate fitness cost of injury does not remain strictly uniform across a male's reproductive lifetime. This 'lifetime' cost also has the potential to vary between individuals of similar age if they differ in their probability of mating in the future (Hernán-dez & Benson, 1998) . Wherever there is variation within the population with respect to future opportunities, an additional source of variation in cost accrual will exist; one that is largely independent of variation in the conventional intrinsic determinants of RHP.
Variation in the rate of cost accrual is likely to be of consequence with respect to the evolution of optimal, evolutionarily stable regimes of contest behaviour. Just as viability selection is expected to be more sensitive to deleterious mutations expressed earlier in an organism's life (Hamilton, 1966) , selection should operate for males to avoid potentially debilitating contest costs early in their reproductive lifetimes, or at ages when the expectation for future reproduction is otherwise at a maximum. However, the strength (and hence phenotypic consequence) of this type of selection will depend upon variation in other age-dependent attributes, most notably RHP, sexual attractiveness, experience, and phenomena such as extrinsic rates of mortality. If the RHP or sexual attractiveness of an animal is likely to severely decline late in life, or if it is unlikely to survive to old age, then selection for delayed aggression may be offset by selection for early reproduction. In this sense, male qualities such as RHP and fighting experience are actually themselves life history traits, although they are rarely viewed as such. Sorting out the relative importance of these factors necessitates a more explicit consideration of how RHP and extrinsic mortality rates vary throughout the lifetime of a male and how this temporal variation is likely to influence the economics of contest participation. Additionally, the benchmark by which a male's success is ultimately measured is the rest of the male population (Kokko, 1997) , which means that the costs and payoffs of lifetime competitive tactics are likely to be frequency dependent, and subject to the same game-theoretical principles incorporated into conventional animal contest models (Maynard Smith, 1982; Enquist & Leimar, 1983 Payne & Pagel, 1997; Payne, 1998) .
P ARTITIONING REPRODUCTIVE VALUE
In conventional life history theory, an organism's capacity or likelihood for future reproductive success is represented by the concept of residual reproductive value (hereafter, RRV; Williams, 1966; Stearns, 1992) . This parameter combines the expectation for both future survival and reproduction, which are generally expected to trade-off against each other (Reznick et al ., 2000) . From a life history-contest behaviour viewpoint, RRV exemplifies what a male would 'stand to lose' if he entered into a potentially injurious contest at any point in his lifetime (a male with higher RRV would stand to lose more). However, clearly, a 'broad sense' measure of RRV for male animals should incorporate future choice of mating tactics because this will effect the expectation for both future survival and reproduction. The calculation of RRV is therefore itself contingent upon future choice of mating tactic; hence, to use RRV as a basis for predicting the best future tactic at any point in time would be tautological. For example, there would be little value in measuring contemporaneous age-based variation in RRV and then using this as a basis for inferring how individual males should optimally invest in combat (or other risky mating tactics) throughout their lifetime.
If the issue of lifetime contest behaviour is to be correctly evaluated, then RRV, the cornerstone life history parameter, needs to be estimated in a way that is independent of the behavioural (or sexually selected) context of interest. In most cases, this will require that broad-sense RRV is partitioned into components relating to the effects of (1) mating behaviour and (2) extrinsic or mating behaviour-independent influences on survival/mating success. The latter term, representing narrow sense or 'strategy-independent' RRV, could then be charted against age to express the putative template upon which age-dependent schedules of mating behaviour could evolve. This template would reflect how male survival and reproduction varies due to the morphological/physiological (viability) cost of going about everyday life (e.g. the net energy cost of metabolism, predator avoidance, injuries due to predatory events, infections, accidents, etc.), coupled with, by definition, a random mating probability. The strategy-dependent component, by contrast, would pre-scribe how this template is modified at each age due to participation in mating behaviour. These parameters may prove difficult to estimate empirically, particularly for species that possess an elaborate repertoire of mating tactics and significant behavioural plasticity, although there may be some species for which it is possible (see later discussion). Nonetheless, the concept of partitioning RRV into strategy-dependent and strategy-independent components is key to the life history view of male mating strategies, and therefore underlies the present approach to modelling lifetime male behaviour.
A MODEL OF LIFETIME FIGHTING M ODEL CONSTRUCTION
Here a discrete time step model is developed in which a hypothetical population of males is tracked through six life stages. All males are subject to a small probability of mortality ( q i ) in each life stage ( i ) that is independent of their choice of mating behaviour. This parameter represents the baseline probability of mortality per life stage that is attributable to indiscriminate accident, infection, starvation, or predation (occurring during activities such as feeding, roosting, and dispersing). For simplicity, all males share common values of q i (hence individuals and their offspring are of uniform genetic quality). Similarly, all individuals share a common baseline probability ( m i ) of acquiring a mating in each life stage, which reflects their chance of encountering a receptive female by simply existing and/or spending time at mate encounter sites without acting aggressively toward other conspecific males. Taken together, the parameters q i and m i describe the animal's strategy-independent schedule of lifetime reproductive value (i.e. the putative ancestral template upon which age-based strategies of aggression could evolve).
In each life stage, individuals may engage in either aggressive or non-aggressive mate searching tactics, and the distribution of these tactics across the six life stages defines each male's lifetime mating strategy. For simplicity, individuals practicing the non-aggressive tactic in any life stage are subject only to the baseline probabilities of mortality ( q i ) and of obtaining a mating ( m i ) in that stage. This can be imagined as a nonterritorial or sneaky mating tactic. Individuals practicing the aggressive tactic in any specific life stage have their baseline mating probability increased by an amount ( b ) that represents the increased likelihood of mating due to territory occupation. They are also subject to the baseline probability of mortality in that stage plus an extra amount due to the cost of territory defence. To express this cost, individuals 'participate' in ten contests against randomly chosen opponents and their value of q i is increased by an amount ( c ) each time they meet another territorial male. For simplicity in the general model (although not necessarily in subsequent elaborations, see later), this cost is always equal. Thus, an 'aggressive' individual's probability of mortality is equal to the baseline ( q i ) plus an amount equivalent to the number of other territorial males he meets in combat (out of an arbitrary maximum of ten per life stage). The values of b and c can be considered as the costs and benefits of territorial defence, with c being dependent upon the frequency of males in the population playing the aggressive tactic. Thus, game-theoretic principles are built into this model via the frequency dependence of this cost parameter.
Specific costs and benefits were not awarded for individual meetings between players; they accumulated as if individuals won vs. lost each contest, or mated vs. failed to mate, on an average adjusted for their tactic (as prescribed by the cost/benefit parameters). To counteract extreme fluctuations in total population size, the baseline probability of mortality ( q i ) was made slightly frequency dependent, which would emulate (to some extent) natural population regulation processes that are density-dependent, such as predation (Bond & Kamil, 2002) and resource depletion. The model did not strictly account for a discrete 'pool' of receptive females (i.e. if one male achieved a mating then this did not reduce the number of matings available to other males in the population); however, matings were at all times allocated with the same probability to males of each behavioural tactic, and male fitness was solely prescribed by mating success and could not be supplemented via postmating investment (Wade & Shuster, 2002) .
Four age-based behavioural strategies were defined: (1) dove , (2) early hawk , (3) late hawk , and (4) hawk . Doves practise the non-aggressive tactic in all six life stages, early hawks practise the aggressive tactic in their first three stages and act non-aggressively thereafter, late hawks practise the converse scheme, and hawks always practise aggression. Each simulation commenced with an equal number of males ( N = 500, randomly designated ages) playing each strategy. Simulations progressed in discrete steps whereby all individuals advanced to the next life stage (until age 7), and were subject to the probabilities of mating and/or dying as prescribed by their respective behavioural tactic (see above). If an individual 'mated', then a single male (age 1) was born into the population playing his strategy. Once a strategy became extinct, it could not re-introduce itself into the population (simulations in which re-introductions were possible yielded identical results). Simulations were run for 10 000 time steps, or until any three strategies became extinct, and the frequency of individuals playing each strategy was averaged over the last 1000 steps.
S PECIFIC SIMULATIONS
Five specific scenarios were modelled: (1) 'constant survival', in which baseline mortality ( q i ) was held constant regardless of age; (2) 'low early survival', in which q i was decreased by a factor ( ∆ q ) in the first three life stages, and increased by that factor in the last three stages (i.e. ∆ q > 0); (3) 'low late survival', in which q i was adjusted with age in the converse manner ( ∆ q < 0); (4) 'low early RHP', in which the cost of fighting ( c ) was decreased by a factor ( ∆ c ) in the first three life stages, and increased by that factor thereafter ( ∆ c > 0); and (5) 'low late RHP', in which c was adjusted with age in the converse manner ( ∆ c < 0). The survival schedules were intended to represent increasing, constant, and reducing regimes of strategy-independent RRV, respectively. As noted earlier, RRV has the potential to vary like this across real-world animal populations due to processes such as the accumulation of life experience, accumulation or depletion of resources, and irreversible loss of attractiveness or 'survival condition' (e.g. the accumulation of injuries). The schedules of varying RHP were intended to represent situations in which contest ability (i.e. the ability to minimize costs) varies throughout the animal's lifetime, perhaps due to ontogenetic changes in physiology or morphology. This lifetime RHP variation was also strategy independent (i.e. it did not depend upon the level of prior contest participation) and, again, could reflect changes in morphology due to growth, or the lifetime acquisition or depletion of resources such as energy reserves. The latter sets of simulations were run with values of ∆ q and ∆ c representing either slight ( ∆ q = ∆ c = ± 0.1) or substantial ( ∆ q = ∆ c = ± 1.0) levels of age-based variation.
In all simulations, the evolutionary fortunes of the four stated strategies ( dove , early hawk , late hawk and hawk ) were charted with respect to variation in the relative cost and benefit of territoriality ( b and c ). The baseline probability of mating ( m i ) was held constant at all times (any variation of this parameter would simply mirror the effects of the manipulation of baseline mortality schedules).
MODEL RESULTS REPRODUCTIVE VALUE, RESIDUAL REPRODUCTIVE VALUE, AND LIFESPAN
The 'strategy-independent' RV and RRV were calculated for each of the first three scenarios (i.e. those in which ∆q was varied to simulate changing patterns of lifetime mortality) using the specified values for mortality (q i ) and reproductive success (m i ) for each age class (i). These values represent the template upon which variation due to behavioural strategy (dove, early hawk, late hawk and hawk) was applied in each simulation. RRV decreased with age in all cases (Table 1) ; however, as expected, the magnitude of the decrease was greatest under conditions of increasing lifetime mortality (i.e. ∆q > 0) and lowest with decreasing lifetime mortality (i.e. ∆q < 0). The mean expected lifespan under the conditions of each simulation was also calculated, and the realized longevity was empirically estimated for all males of ESS populations by averaging the age at death for all males in the last 1000 time steps (Table 1) . Theoretically, expected lifespan should represent the upper limit for realized lifespan because the inclusion of territorial strategies means that higher breeding rates can be achieved by some males earlier in their lifetime, but only with increased risk of mortality. Accordingly, realized lifespan was lower than the strategy-independent expected lifespan in all simulations ( Table 1) , showing that hawk, early hawk and possibly late hawk strategists drove the mean population lifespan downwards. Nonetheless, expected and realized longevity varied approximately in tandem and were greatest in simulations in which ∆q < 0 (i.e. with decreasing lifetime mortality). Individuals therefore tended to live longer in simulations in which baseline mortality was high early in life (i < 4) and low thereafter.
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE SOLUTIONS
Evolutionarily stable solutions could be defined for most combinations of b and c across all modelled scenarios (Figs 1, 2) , except for the case of substantially increasing baseline mortality (in which populations tended to decrease to extinction despite frequencydependent controls). The solution for scenario 1 (constant lifetime q i and c) was virtually identical to that of scenario 2 (∆q = +0.1); thus, only results from the later scenario are illustrated. Two or more lifetime strategies were evolutionarily stable (i.e. present in the equilibrium solution at any level) across most conditions in most scenarios. In line with intuitive expectation, dove strategists tended more likely to feature in the ESS solution with increasing values of c and/or decreasing values of b (i.e. when the cost of aggression was high and its benefit low), and hawk strategists tended more likely to exist under converse conditions. The early hawk strategy was only evolutionarily stable under a very limited set of conditions (∆c = −1.0 and b < 0.5, when RHP substantially decreased with age and the benefits of territoriality were not high; Fig. 2 ). By contrast, late hawk was evolutionarily stable, either singly or in combination with other strategies, across a broad range of situations, including those in which baseline mortality either increased or decreased with age, and even when RHP declined slightly with age (i.e. ∆c = −0.1). This strategy was completely absent from only one scenario; that in which RHP decreased substantially (i.e. ∆c = −1.0).
Regarding the abundance of each strategy in the ESS solution (Figs 3, 4) , dove tended to increase most markedly with increasing c, and also, but less strikingly, with decreasing b. Dove was the major constituent of all ESS populations in which q i increased, and RHP decreased, with age. Individuals playing the hawk strategy became most abundant in all simulations as c neared zero, primarily because this strategy must always yield maximum benefits (among the present alternatives) whenever c = 0 and b > 0. Hawk was otherwise scarce except for when RHP decreased substantially with age (∆c = −1.0). As expected, the proportion of late hawk strategists was highest in simulations where RHP increased with age (Fig. 4) , and was virtually zero when lifetime RHP decreased substantially. The fortune of this strategy in the face of varying baseline mortality was less clear-cut (Fig. 3) . Minor age-related variation in q i did not appear to affect relative abundance greatly; however, late hawk strategists clearly suffered (primarily due to the proliferation of doves) when mortality increased substantially with age (i.e. ∆q = +1.0; the scenario in which realized lifespan was also most significantly reduced; Table 1 ). Late hawks dominated with substantially decreasing mortality (∆q = −1.0); however, an equilibrium solution was not attained for the majority of these simulations (Fig. 1) and thus had to be extrapolated. Nonetheless, this strategy appeared generally more viable because baseline mortality decreased, rather than increased, with age.
DISCUSSION SEXUAL SELECTION, LIFE HISTORY, AND THE LIFETIME FIGHTING MODEL
The life history view of sexual selection treats investments into behaviours and/or morphologies made at various stages of an organism's lifetime as not being strictly independent of each other. In some cases, such as when experience is important (Whitehouse, 1997; Hoefler, 2002) , prior participation may increase the pay-off from future participation. However, when such traits carry significant viability costs, as in the case of potentially injurious fighting behaviour, present and future participation will likely trade-off (and this would be apparent within but not necessarily between individuals; see McElligott & Hayden, 2000; Reznick et al., 2000) . In these cases, the risks associated with performing costly behaviours, or expressing costly morphological traits, can be treated as a resource to be allocated across the organism's lifetime, in much the same way as conventional reproductive effort (Stearns, 1992) . However, the reproductive benefit (as Table 1 . 'Strategy-independent' residual reproductive value (RRV) and reproductive value (RV), and expected and realized lifespan for each of the first five modelled scenarios Scenario Data are RRV, with RV in parenthesis. Mean expected lifespan was calculated on the basis of strategy-independent mortality and breeding values, and thus represents the upper limit for realized lifespan (i.e. which would reduce from these levels due to participation in fighting behaviour), which was averaged over the last 1000 time steps of each simulation. ∆q refers to the lifetime schedule of mortality, which, when positive, indicates an increasing lifetime probability of mortality (see text).
well as the potential cost in some cases) of a particular sexually selected behaviour will ultimately depend upon what other males in the population are doing, and so the required model is one that incorporates both life history and evolutionary game theory principles (Kokko, 1997) . A second fundamental tenet of the life history view is that some variation in key life history traits will exist independently of, and potentially influence the evolution of, lifetime patterns of sexual trait expression. All animals will be subject to age-specific risk of injury/mortality due to stochastic factors such as predation, infection, and food shortages (etc.) that are either partly or wholly independent of sexually selected aspects of their phenotype. This 'strategyindependent' pattern of mortality, coupled with the equivalent pattern of reproductive success, should define a template for the evolution of lifetime sexual behaviour, and hence dictate the relative merits of particular lifetime strategies across particular species.
The model presented here emphasized both the game-theoretic nature and life history consequences of contest behaviour, in addition to exploring how lifetime variation in strategy-independent survival probability and contest cost accrual (i.e. RHP) affected ESS solutions. Individuals were subject to increased mortality rates as a consequence of territoriality, and hence a lifetime trade-off in reproductive investment was realized via the varying probability of surviving to the latter age classes. Game-theoretic principles were built into the model via the positive frequency-dependence of contest costs (i.e. the increasing cost of territoriality along with increasing population frequencies of hawks, early hawks, and late hawks). The key results may be summarized as: (1) most equilibrium populations consisted of two or more strategies; (2) early hawk was virtually absent from all equilibrium populations; (3) late hawk was present across a broad range of situations, but most notably when RHP Figure 1 . The constitution of equilibrium populations in simulations incorporating either slight (i.e. ∆q = ± 0.1) or substantial (i.e. ∆q = ± 1.0) lifetime variation in strategy-independent mortality (q i ), represented as a function of the cost (yaxes) and benefit (x-axes) of territoriality. Negative ∆q values indicate decreasing lifetime rates of mortality. The presence of dove, late hawk, and hawk strategies at any frequency in the equilibrium population is indicated by the letters D, L, and H, respectively, and regions including late hawk are shaded. ESS, evolutionarily stable strategy. increased with age, and; (4) dove tended to prosper as the benefit of territoriality decreased and the cost increased, and hawk tended to prosper with the converse conditions. More generally, lifetime variation in 'strategy-independent' factors, such as mortality (q i ) and RHP (c), significantly affected the equilibrium solutions, particularly when each parameter was varied substantially with age (i.e. when ∆q = ∆c = ± 1.0). Several of these findings conform to intuitive expectation. For example, the popularity of hawk vs. dove with variation in b and c is consistent with contemporary cost-benefit economic views regarding the evolution of a high cost/high payoff male tactic such as territoriality (Brown & Orians, 1970) . There are also good reasons to expect that the late hawk strategy would be widely evolutionarily stable. Life history theory predicts increases in reproductive investment as future opportunities decrease (Stearns, 1992 ; for empirical support, see Magnhagen & Vestergaard, 1991; Candolin, 1998; Poizat, Rosecchi & Crivelli, 1999) , and this strategy is generally optimal when contest economics (Parker, 1974) and game theory principles (Kokko, 1997) are factored in. On this basis, early hawk would be expected to feature in equilibrium populations only under a very restricted set of circumstances, as was the case in the present model. Variation in lifetime RHP also influenced the solution as intuitively expected, with early hawk favoured only when RHP decreased substantially with age.
The primary outcomes of this simulation also relate well to existing life history-based models of male behaviour. Kokko (1997) demonstrated, using a game theory-based algebraic model, that increasing lifetime sexual trait expression is an ESS strategy under a wide range of conditions. Although conceived within the context of mate choice, this result extends to con- Figure 2 . The constitution of equilibrium populations in simulations incorporating either slight (i.e. ∆c = ± 0.1) or substantial (i.e. ∆c = ± 1.0) lifetime variation in strategy-independent resource holding potential (RHP), represented as a function of the cost (y-axes) and benefit (x-axes) of territoriality. Negative ∆c values indicate decreasing lifetime cost to territoriality (i.e. increasing RHP). The presence of dove, early hawk, late hawk, and hawk strategies at any frequency in the equilibrium population is indicated by the letters D, E, L, and H, respectively, and regions including late hawk are shaded. ESS, evolutionarily stable strategy. test situations, particularly those in which 'condition' is an important determinant of fighting ability, and trade-offs between early and late-life contest participation are prevalent. Kokko's model is an excellent companion to the present simulation because it also incorporated intrapopulation variation in intrinsic quality (or viability) per se, which equates to differences in baseline fighting ability (i.e. the capacity for costly trait expression). Substantial variation in this parameter could, in some cases, alter the optimal lifetime pattern of costly trait expression (see, for example, Gosling et al., 2000) . Lifetime trade-offs were also realized in a subtly different way: whereas territoriality in the present simulation extracted a cost in terms of future survival, trait expression (i.e. fighting or risky behavioural strategies) in Kokko's model reduced each individual's capacity for both future survival and future trait expression. The popularity of a late hawktype strategy across both models, despite differences in general approach and parameters, therefore suggests this as a robust finding. Second, Enquist & Leimar (1990) presented a model to predict the occurrence of fatal fighting based upon the lifetime consequences of such behaviour. They found that fatal fighting will be evolutionarily stable whenever the value of obtaining a resource in the present is greater than the value of the future, and that fighting will be most intense when the value of the future nears zero. The model was not explicitly formulated to deal with lifetime behavioural variation, but it nonetheless generally predicts that, if resource ownership is essential to reproductive success, investment in fighting should again increase with age (particularly in later age classes). The present simulation is not without its limitations. A total of only four lifetime behavioural strategies were defined, which is hardly an exhaustive treatment of all evolutionary possibilities. The defined age-specific strategies (i.e. early hawk and late hawk) had an invariant switch to and from 'territoriality', which also renders them sensitive to variation in over- all lifespan between specific simulations. Furthermore, elaborations upon the basic simulation (i.e. scenario 1) were limited in scope, and thus more potentially realistic scenarios, such as when different life history parameters (stable lifetime mortality and RHP) vary in tandem, await future analysis. Despite these limitations, this model has a useful heuristic role, firstly by reiterating the importance of life history (this time explicitly for contests) and, secondly, by suggesting the utility of isolating strategy-independent components of life history. The way that these concepts could be used to explain patterns of lifetime fighting in nature is discussed below.
LIFETIME FIGHTING IN THE WILD
Explicit consideration of the life history consequences of fighting should prove particularly valuable where investment into contest behaviour is free to vary throughout an organism's lifetime. As we have seen, both here and previously (Kokko, 1997) , the general theoretic prediction is for increasing lifetime investment, although declines are expected in some situations (e.g. when RHP declines substantially with age). There is an existing suite of empirical reports, across animals such as elephant seals (Le Boeuf & Reiter, 1988; Haley, 1994) , deer (Clutton-Brock, Guinness & Albon, 1982; Komers, Pelabon & Stenstrom, 1997) , snakes (Madsen et al., 1993) , frogs (Howard, 1981) , and butterflies (Kemp, 2002) , of age-graded increases in aggressive or otherwise risky male tactics (for a review, see also Dominey, 1984) . Aggression and competitive success increase concomitantly with ontogenetic body size increases in many of these cases and, as such, they are best represented by the increasing lifetime RHP scenario (Figs 2, 4) . A straightforward interpretation of these cases can be made in light of either conventional contest theory or the life history viewpoint (Waltz & Wolf, 1984) . However, only the life history model can also explain situations where increasing lifetime aggression is not matched by appreciable changes in RHP, such as in the butterfly Hypolimnas bolina (Kemp, 2002) .
There are also examples of decreasing lifetime aggression in the wild. Many of these involve territorial insects, such as wasps (e.g. Sphecius grandis; Hastings, 1989) , bees (e.g. Hoplitis anthocopides; Eickwort, 1977) , dragonflies (e.g. Nannophya pygmaea; Tsubaki & Ono, 1987) , damselflies (e.g. Calopteryx maculata; Forsyth & Montgomerie, 1987) , flies (e.g. Cuterebra austeni; Kemp & Alcock, 2003) , and butterflies (e.g. Astraptes galesus, Melanitis leda; Alcock, 1988; Kemp, 2003) . Traditionally, this pattern is thought to result from old, low-RHP males resorting to sneaky tactics to make the 'best of a bad job' (sensu Dawkins, 1980) . In many of these cases, it is clear that asymmetries in RHP (i.e. energy reserves, wing wear, etc.) determine the outcome of pairwise contests (Marden & Waage, 1990 ). However, a life history view suggests that age-related RHP declines would be driven, at least in part, by levels of earlier contest participation. Individuals that abstained from territoriality when young would likely remain competitive later in life than otherwise expected, which raises the question of why these males do not delay their fighting investment until later in life? This analysis suggests that the answer may lie in how much of the lifetime RHP decline is due to contest participation vs. how much would occur 'naturally' due to strategy-independent concerns. If RHP declines mainly due to contest participation, early and late life contest participation will trade-off, as in the model of Kokko (1997) , and delayed trait expression appears to be the most likely outcome (this is represented by scenario 1 of the present simulation, in which late hawk is widely popular). Verbally, males would be better served here by making the most of 'serendipitous' mating opportunities when young before seriously investing in territoriality later on. On the other hand, if a sizeable proportion of the RHP decline proceeds due to 'strategy-independent' concerns (i.e. the 'cost of living'), then early life aggression appears more likely (Figs 2,  4) . Under these conditions, individuals should make the most of their maximum young-age RHP because this will decline with age irrespective of their level of territorial investment.
The extent to which the above considerations are important to the evolution of lifetime contest regimes remains to be tested empirically. Additional influences, such as lifetime mortality rates, are likely to affect the plausibility of certain lifetime strategies, although the direction of these effects may be more difficult to predict. In general, these strategy-independent life history components may be estimated empirically if males are made to live out their lifetimes without engaging in costly or risky reproductive strategies; this should prove possible in certain insect species. In the absence of such data, however, it is clear that consideration of life history principles leads to a novel view of animal behaviour. With regard to many species with old-age competitive declines, such as Calopteryx damselflies, the life history view differs from the contemporary one in that early age competitive ability is considered a consequence, rather than a cause, of a lifetime strategy of territorial investment.
THE FUTURE OF ANIMAL CONTEST STUDIES
Over the last decade, there has been renewed appreciation of the relevance of life history principles to sexual selection but, as noted, most studies focus upon intersexual selection (Cordts & Partridge, 1996; Kokko et al., 1999 Kokko et al., , 2002 Jones et al., 2000; Proulx et al., 2002) . Theories regarding life history effects on male ornamentation, advertisement effort, and female mate choice have consequently attained reasonable complexity (Kokko & Lindstrom, 1996; Kokko, 1997 Kokko, , 1998 Kokko et al., 2002) . By contrast, although there are empirical examples dealing explicitly with fighting behaviour and related issues (Hernández & Benson, 1998; Gosling et al., 2000; Kemp, 2002) , as well as a limited theoretical treatment (Enquist & Leimar, 1990) , there is no general, congealing conceptual basis for incorporating life history principles into the study of animal contests. This may be because a lifetime perspective has not always been strictly necessary to understand the patterns and dynamics of contest outcome in purely proximate terms, and studies have tended to focus on these proximate explanations.
Throughout this study, key issues relating to the life history view of fighting behaviour have been presented in the hope that this will stimulate future attention in this area. This view has much in common with that for age-dependent sexual advertisement (Kokko, 1997) , with the key prediction for increasing lifetime investment applying widely (but not exclusively) in both cases. Consideration of life history principles will sometimes lead to explanations largely consummate with conventional contest theory; in other cases, novel insights may be gained (Gosling et al., 2000; Kemp, 2002) . There is also the promise of deriving explanations for situations deemed 'contradictory' to conventional gametheoretic models of contest behaviour (Hernández & Benson, 1998) . The life history viewpoint may therefore exert a unifying influence over contest theory, particularly (but not exclusively) because the costs and benefits of aggression can be expressed in the universally applicable currencies of contemporary vs. residual reproductive value. It is also suggested that 'strategy-independent' components of an individual's life history should be considered in studies of lifetime fighting strategies. The relevant empirical data for estimating these parameters are presently lacking, which makes specific predictions difficult to formulate; hence, this appears to be a key focus for future empirical efforts.
